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In the past 22 months, the Asian countries have witnessed their most severe 
economic contractions since the oil crisis. Starting from July 1997, the Asian 
Financial Crisis has shaken the financial markets and political stability in the region. 
The onslaught of unrestrained and volatile international capital was fully 
demonstrated in Asia. As markets ran into panic, currencies of baht, rupiah, won, 
ringgit, peso and others also underwent substantial devaluations. Credit crunch and 
outlook downgrading have swallowed every vigour of many once active financial 
markets. 
However, the crisis at the same time unveils the inherent weakness of Asian 
economies. Despite the high growth rates，strong domestic savings and prudent fiscal 
policies, none of the Asian countries could avoid stumbling into a world-class 
liquidity crisis. The severe mismatch in funding and the failure of effective 
intermediation have doomed the economies since the early days. What Asia lacks is a 
long-term capital market that can transform her wealth into powerful liquidity to 
sustain economic growth. This is exactly a well-functioned debt market does. 
Hong Kong, with an established legal framework, pools of professional 
practitioners，advanced market infrastructure and full financial liberalisation, should 
play a proactive role in the development of such a debt market. Her unique 
geographical position of both within the orbit of emerging market and at the vicinity 
to Mainland China offers the SAR unparalleled opportunity to develop as a regional 
debt centre as well as a premier financing centre for China. 
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The twelfth of September 1998 was a bad day for Hong Kong debt market 
players. On this Saturday the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) issued 
letters to request the supranational borrowers, which are the major issuers in the 
territory, to desist from raising fimds at short maturity. This special request, 
originally aimed to stop the speculators from getting into swaps with the 
supranational borrowers and hence shorting Hong Kong dollar, nevertheless closed 
down the short end of the local bond market virtually. 
While this moral request was later lifted following the effective adoption of 
seven new measures by the HKMA in strengthening the currency board system, the 
authority has in fact done a lot in developing the debt market in Hong Kong. 
Though the colony, now the Special Administration Region (SAR), has been well 
recognised as a major international financial centre, its debt market was just an 
emerging one in the 1980s. It was not until the introduction ofthe Exchange Fund 
Bills programme in 1990 that the development oflocal debt market was ignited. Mr. 
Joseph Yam, ChiefExecutive of the HKMA, used the acronym “B.I.R.D.S.，which 
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stands for Benchmark, Mrastructure, Rating, Demand and Supply^" to analyse the 
development of debt market in Hong Kong. 
The HKMA has made significant efforts in building up a benchmark yield 
curve, which is advantageous to the pricing of issues in both primary and secondary 
markets. Through the public tendering of various maturity of Exchange Fund Bills 
and Notes in the market, the HKMA has successfully established the Hong Kong 
dollar benchmark yield curve from 28 days to 10 years. By now，Exchange Fund 
Bills and Notes (EFBN) have become the most liquid public debt and provide the 
most reliable benchmark yield curve in the region. As at 31 January 1999, the total 
amount ofExchange Fund Bills and Notes outstanding was HKD97.5 billion with an 
average daily trading turnover ofHKD13.4 billion�. On the other hand, the HKMA 
has also offered various tax incentives to the issuance of high quality private debt 
paper in Hong Kong. Table 1 shows the growth pattem of both public and private 
debt in Hong Kong from 1991 to 1998. 
TABLE 1 OUTSTANDmG HONG KONG DOLLAR DEBT ESfSTRUMENTS 
HKD billion (31 December) 1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 
ExchangeFundbills&notes 14.6 58.73 91.85 101.65 97.45 
ExchangeFundBills 14.6 44.33 70.25 72.85 63.85 
Exchange FundNotes 0 14.4 21.60 28.80 33.60 
Private sector debt instruments^ 23.2 138.32 189.56 243.86 292.66 
Floating rate N.A. 86,26 127.97 167.97 159.53 
Fixedrate N.A. 52.06 61.59 75.89 133.13 
TOTAL 37.8 197.05 281.41 345.51 390.11 
Source of data: HKMA statistics 
1 Yam, Joseph. “Development of the debt market." Speech; Asian Debt Conference on 14 July 1997. 
2 Source: HKMA statistics found at website http://www.info.gov.hkMma/stat 
3 While the EFBN are all settled through the CMU ofHKMA, not all the private sector issues employ 
this settlement system. For example, among the HKD292.66 billion of private debt issues in 1998, 
around 76% or HKD223.64 billion of which are settled through CMU. Source: HKMA statistics 
found at website in footnote 2. 
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The development of debt market in Hong Kong is also enhanced by the 
infrastructure and technological platform built up by the HKMA. In April 1983, 
an efficient clearing and settlement system was set up using the Central 
Moneymarkets Unit (CMU) system. A detailed description of the CMU system will 
be given under section of 'Clearing and Settlement' in Chapter EL Coupled with a 
seamless interface with the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) payment system 
implemented in December 1996, the infrastructure provides both real time and end 
of day delivery versus payment service for both HKD arid foreign currency-
denominated debt securities. In addition, to facilitate cross border trades in 
securities, the CMU has also been linked with the Central Securities Depositories 
(CSDs) in Australia and New Zealand. A similar linkage is now underway to hook 
up with the Government's Securities Book-Entry System in Mainland China. These 
linkages will facilitate trading and holding of Asian bonds by Hong Kong and 
overseas investors, thereby enlarging the investor base ofHK debt instruments. 
Credit rating provides crucial information on the risk and thus pricing of an 
issue. Four renowned international rating agencies including Moody's and Standard 
& Poor,s have already set up offices in Hong Kong. Though their ratings are no 
longer applicable in assessing the eligibility of various CMU instruments for REPO 
purpose, they are still applied in the identification of liquefiable assets to satisfy the 
statutory liquidity ratio required by the Banking Ordinance and the classification of 
debt instruments for tax concession. 
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bi addition, to enhance the liquidity of debt instruments, the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong (SEHK) is planning to provide a platform for Exchange Fund and 
quasi-govemment bodies such as the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC)， 
Airport Authority (AA) and the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) to list 
their debt securities on the Exchange. A consultation paper was already issued by 
the Stock Exchange ofHong Kong (SEHK) in January 1999 to invite comments on 
the issue. The prospective listing has a dominant supporting effect on the market 
demand of debt instruments. While the accessibility of debt instruments to retail 
investors will be greatly enhanced, we can foresee a flow of domestic savings from 
the equity stocks or bank deposits to those high quality debt instruments. Besides, 
the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) scheme to be launched in December 2000 is 
also a significant source of demand for high quality debt securities. It is estimated 
that the asset size ofMPF will reach USD1.5 billion in its first year of operation, and 
the fund size will rise to US$9 billion by the end of the fifth year^. 
On the supply side, corporations are more readily tapping fUnds through 
debt and note issuance. The HKD1.5 billion issue of Federal National Mortgage 
Corporation^ in July 1997 marked a major breakthrough for the Hong Kong Dollar 
market. Moreover, the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation established in March 
1997 will bring liquidity and standardisation to mortgage securitisation in Hong 
Kong. Capitalised at HKD2 billion from the Exchange Fund，the Corporation is 
expected to raise a total ofHKD40 billion in its note and debt issuance programme^. 
4 Tsang, Donald. "Asian Bond Market." Speech on Asian Debt Conference 6 July 1998. 
Federal National Mortgage Corporation is the largest U.S. corporation in term oftotal assets and is 
the second largest debt issuer next to the U.S. Treasuries. Source: Anonymous. "Fannie Mae 
HKD1.5 billion global prompts interest in dollar bloc" Euroweek. (London) 11 July 1997. 
6 Lamoreaux, Pamela. "A busy year for Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation." Housing Finance 
hitemational. (Chicago) September 1998. 
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The Corporation will become one of the most active and regular issuers of high 
quality debt securities in the territory. 
While Mr. Yam's "B.LR.D.S.” analysis outlines a bright prospect for the 
Hong Kong debt market, the writer wishes to emphasise that the lack of liquidity, 
incentive and co-ordinated regional forces are the major hindrances to the 
emergence of an Asian debt centre. However, albeit the negative impact on 
economic recession and political instability in some countries, the Asian Financial 
Crisis has brought critical influence and can be the right catalyst to kick-start the 
development of a regional debt centre. 
The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) has shaken the financial markets and 
political stability in the region. While investment banks are required to make huge 
provisions in Indonesia and Thailand, financing activities of corporations all over 
the region have come to a standstill. The turmoil has swallowed the energy of many 
once active financial markets. On the other hand, in defending the peg with USD, 
Hong Kong has undergone a painful adjustment of its assets price and economic 
structure. Asset price including property valuation dropped by over 50% from the 
peak in July 1997 to the trough in September 1998. The all-way-high 
unemployment and bankruptcy rates have weakened domestic demand and 
confidence on domestic companies. Credit crunch and downgrading in the market 
make borrowing unreasonably difficult and costly. Lti addition. Government's 
intervention in the stock market in August 1998 has aroused unprecedented 
controversy and vigorous debate. All these have made the market players extremely 
cautious in arranging new deals or planning re-entry to the market. 
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While the AFC has fully demonstrated the onslaught of unrestrained and 
volatile international capital in Asia, the crisis at the same time unveils the inherent 
weakness of Asian economies. Despite the high GDP growth rates, strong domestic 
savings and prudent fiscal policy, the Asian countries could not avoid stumbling into 
a world-class liquidity crisis.切 fact, currency crisis is not unique to Asia. Europe 
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suffered from the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in the late 1980s. The 
difference between the two is that Asia lacks a long-term and effective mechanism 
to channel funds within the region. Domestic savings in Asia are invested overseas 
in long-term investments that flow back into Asia mostly in the form of short-term 
bank loans. What even worse is the employment of these funding to invest 
excessively in illiquid long-term projects and to over-accumulate on unproductive 
inputs. 
In short，the crisis is a mismatch in fUnding and a failure of effective 
intermediation. The over-borrowing in short-term foreign currency debt and the 
under-development of domestic long-term capital markets are roots of the crisis. 
Could we transform the wealth ofAsia into powerful liquidity in domestic markets, 
we could get away from this liquidity virus. The theme of the paper is on this exact 
prescription to nurture a deep, liquid and mature regional debt market. 
The paper will start with a briefhistory and development ofthe Hong Kong 
debt market. Special references will be made to the market infrastructure and debt 
trading system. Next, government's efforts in promoting the local debt market will 
7 Anonymous. "The Asian Debt Market." Asiaweek. 19 December 1997, p.68. 
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be studied. The establishment of the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC) 
and the implementation of the Mandatoty Provident Fund QAP¥) scheme will be 
highlighted. It will be followed by a wider perspective on regional forces in 
particidarly the influence of the AFC on the development of Hong Kong into a 
regional debt centre. Jn the conclusion part, opportunities in the area of H-bond 





The research is mainly conducted through three channels. First, an extensive 
literature review on the topic is done by going through academic journals of finance 
and periodicals of investment banking. 
Second, various publications of investment banks and regulatory agencies in 
Hong Kong are studied. In particular, the writer gets quite a lot of information and 
up-to-date data from the home page of various multilateral and regulatory agencies 
such as the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation, 
the Stock Exchange ofHong Kong and the Securities and Futures Commission. An 
electronic search using the PROQUEST database is also made to access hundreds of 
related articles. 
Third, the writer also consulted a few professionals and market practitioners. 
They include investment bankers, government regulators and fund managers. 
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On researching the literature, the writer encountered a few excellent 
publications on the history and early development of local debt market. While these 
publications provide a useful base to start the research, the writer does not wish to 
replicate this history and description of the local market, bistead, the Asian 
Financial Crisis and its influence on the prospective development of Hong Kong 
debt market form the focus of this paper. 
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CHAPTERm 
mSTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEBT MARKET 
Early History ofDebt histruments 
The development of debt instruments in Hong Kong can be traced back to 
1842, when the Treaty ofNanking established Hong Kong as a British trading port 
and naval base. At that time there was active discounting of commercial bills in 
support of trade by local merchants. h\ 1866，trading of equities and debentures 
first appeared and following the establishment of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 
1891, such trading has become more active. 
While trading of these primitive instruments emerged as early as the 
nineteenth century, it was not until the early 1970s that a number of banks began 
issuing HKD certificates of deposit (CDs). Slater Walker Hutchinson, American 
Express Bank, Hong Kong Shanghai Bank and Wardleys were the early issuers of 
8 
Bank, Erics. "The Emerging Fixed-ticome Markets in Asia." Basingstoke: Macmillian Publishers 
Ltd. 1994 P.56. 
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HKD CDs. This was followed by the introduction HKD commercial paper to the 
market.9 
Bond issuance in Hong Kong was not active in the 1970s. Due to the 
aversion of traditional Chinese towards borrowings, an absence of tax incentives and 
one-sided preference of investors towards equities, the markets of bonds and other 
fixed-income securities were not well developed. 
Development in the 80s 
It was not until 1975 that the first issuance of government bond started the 
development of Hong Kong debt market. The HKD250 million 5-year issue was a 
prelude of today's HKD97.5 billion worth of Exchange Fund Bills and Notes. 
Another important development was the series of bond and note issues introduced 
by the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) since 1976. The quasi-
govemment statutory corporation is by far the largest and most regular issuer in the 
local debt market.^^ 
In 1988, the Australian government airline, Quantas was finally authorised 
by the Hong Kong Government to issue bonds denominated in Hong Kong Dollar. 
This marked the ftill intemationalisation of the colony's local currency - Hong Kong 
Dollar. hi the next year, a HKD500 million 6-year bond was issued by the 
^ 
'° Emery, Robert F. The Bond Markets ofDeveloping East Asia. Colorado: 
WestviewPress, 1997，p.5-6. 
12 
Memational Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Issues by the World Bank 
and other multilateral agencies f o l l o w e d . 
Recent Development 
The nineties constituted the golden age of the local debt market. Following 
the Financial Secretary's budget speech in 1989 which unveiled government plans to 
develop the local debt market, the Exchange Fund Bills Programme was formally 
introduced in March 1990. Under the programme, bills of 28, 91, 182 and 364 days 
maturity were put up for tender regularly. The bills are issued by the Hong Kong 
government for the Exchange Fund, and represent the senior, unsecured obligations 
of the government. In May and October 1993, 2 and 3 years Exchange Fund Notes 
were introduced respectively. By the end of 1993, the total outstanding ofExchange 
Fund Bills and Notes had increased to a notional value of HKD28.1 billion. This 
was followed by the issuance of 5, 7 and 10 years Exchange Fund Notes in 
September 1994, November 1995 and October 1996 respectively. With its tax-
exempt and virtually risk-free status, this programme has been very successful in 
creating an active secondary market in bills and notes with various maturity. Jn 
January 1999, the total amount of Exchange Fund Bills and Notes (EFBN) 
outstanding was $97.5 billion. Trading in these instruments is so active that a daily 
average turnover ofHKD13.4 billion or 13.7% oftotal outstanding is achieved]� 
^^  Emery, Robert F. The Bond Markets ofDeveloping East Asia. Colorado: 
WestviewPress, 1997, p.5-6. 
12 
Source: HKMA statistics found at website http://www.info.gov.hkM:ma/stat 
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With the successful launching of the Exchange Fund Bills and Notes 
Programme in the 1990s, a stable supply of high quality HKD debt paper and a 
reliable benchmark yield curve for HKD debt was created. The latter provided the 
spark for private debt issues in the territory. As the bills and notes are brought to 
market through a weekly auction process under a strictly competitive and absolutely 
， 
non-intervened market environment, the 10-years-long benchmark yield curve is 
reliable to facilitate the pricing of private issues in the primaty and secondary 
markets. 
Besides the governmental issues of EFBN, local statutory corporations such 
as the Mass Transit Railway Corporation ^vfTRC), the Kowloon Canton Railway 
Corporation (KCRC) and the Airport Authority (AA) have also played active roles 
in debt issuance. Among which the MTRC is the most frequent and regular issuer. 





In the past, the Hong Kong government has been an issuer of medium-term 
government bonds. In 1975，the government issued a HDK250 million 5-year bond 
It was repaid in full in 1980. hi 1984，the government issued a second bond for 
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HKD1 billion. It was also redeemed in fiill at maturity in 1989. Later on the 
government had issued 3 bonds totally for HKD3 billion in 1991，1992 and 1993. 
Again these 3 bonds were all retired without re-issuance. After the 1993 issue, the 
government ceased issuance through the bond programme but instead began 
issuance through the Exchange Fund note programme. ^ ^ 
Exchange Fund Bills and Notes 
Exchange Fund Bills are money market instruments with maturity less than 1 
year and was first created in March 1990 under the Exchange Fund Bills 
Programme. Under this programme, bills with maturity of28, 91，182 and 364 days 
are put up for tender. Later on Exchange Fund Notes were brought to the market in 
1993. There are now 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years issues. The papers are auctioned in the 
market where 223 recognised official dealers^^ tender bids for bills. Allocations are 
made in ascending order of yield. Subsequent trading in the secondary market is 
arranged by 33 authorised market makers^^ who provide both bid and ask prices 
during normal money market hours. 
Private instruments 
Interbank deposits 
^^  Banks, Erik. The Emerging Fixed-hicome Markets in Asia. Basingstoke: 
Macmillian Publishers Ltd., 1994, p.58-60. 
^^AsatllMarchl998. 
15 As at October 1997. 
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They are short-term unsecured liabilities of the 3-tier banking system. The 
interbank market has existed since the late 1950s. As foreign banks in Hong Kong 
do not have an extensive retail network to absorb funding, they rely heavily on the 
interbank market and usage has been heavy. Maturity range from ovemight to 
twelvemonths.i6 
Negotiable certificates of deposit CNCD) 
NCDs are the senior and unsecured obligations of bank issuers. They are 
receipts for time deposits of fixed maturity, normally ranging from one month to 
five years. They are bearer in form and usually pay a fixed rate of interest. The 
first NCD can be traced back to 1973 when Slater Walker Hutchinson issued a 
floating rate HKD NCD. 
Commercial paper (CP) 
CPs are short-term instruments issued by large corporations with good credit 
standing. They are unsecured in nature with maturity ranging from one week to one 
year. Due to the relatively high minimum denomination (HKD500,000), most ofthe 
issuance are taken up by institutional investors. Major issuers in CP include the 
MTRC, KCRC, HK Electric, China Light and Power，Swire Pacific, Hong Kong 
Telecom，Jardine Matheson, Cheung Kong, Hutchison Whampoa, etc. 




. • • 
Bonds can be fixed or floating rate, senior or subordinated, secured or 
unsecured, instruments. Maturity range from one year up. They are issued as 
registered instruments and are underwritten by a syndicate of merchant banks and 
securities firms. There are mainly three types of issuers. The first type is private 
corporations such as the blue chips. The second type is statutory corporation such as 
the MTRC, the KCRC and the AA. The third type is foreign corporation with 
international standing. This last type includes a number of top-rated supranational 
organisations such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the 
teemational Finance Corporation. 
Mortgage-backed securities 
These are instruments secured by mortgages from issuers，portfolio and are 
relatively new in the local market. The first deal was closed in 1994 when Solomon 
Brothers arranged a HKD500 million fixed rate bond for Bank of America Asia, 
securitised by mortgages from the bank's portfolio. As the property market in Hong 
Kong has enjoyed prosperous growth since the 80s，mortgage financing accounted 
for almost 40% of total loans granted in the territory. As the demand for residential 
mortgage financing is robust with sustainable growth, the government is concerned 
with the concentration and liquidity risks. A series of policies have been adopted to 
alleviate the situation. This will be discussed in details under the section of 
‘Establishment ofHong Kong Mortgage Corporation' in Chapter rV. 
17 
Market hifrastructure and Trading Systems 
Credit Ratings 
Though Hong Kong has no domestic rating agency, Moody's, Standard & 
Poor's, Thomson Bankwatch and Fitch IBCA all have offices in the territory, 
Moody's Investor Services established a regional office in Hong Kong in June 1994 
while Standard and Poor's also set up an office at the end of 1994. Their ratings are 
recognised by the HKMA in the assessment of various debt securities to qualify for 
liquefiable assets and tax concession. Traditionally very few Hong Kong-based 
private companies are willing to disclose sensitive financial information for a credit 
rating. However, facing the strong funding needs to participate into giant 
infrastructure projects and the increasing demands from investors, there has 
gradually been a change in market attitude towards the credibility for a credit rating. 




Trading ofdebt instruments in Hong Kong mainly operates in three markets: 
the market ofExchange Fund Bills and Notes, the SEHK and the Over-the-counter 
market.i7 
Market ofExchange Fund Bills and Notes 
The primary issuance of EFBN is done through a weekly auction process 
where 223 recognised dealers tender bids. Allocations are made in ascending order 
of yield, hivestors must submit their orders through these recognised dealers. A 
typical lot size is HKD10 million. To enhance the liquidity in secondary market, a 
market making system was designed under which a group of 33 dealers is selected to 
quote both bid and ask prices. This promotes liquidity and makes the secondary 
trading ofEFBN most active among all debt instruments in the Asia region. 
The HKMA and the SEHK have plans to list EFN on the Exchange by end of 
1999. This prospective development will be explored in detail in Chapter VI. 
Stock Exchange ofHong Kong 
While the SEHK figured amongst the top ten stock exchanges in the world in 
terms of market capitalisation before the Asian Financial Crisis, the listing of debt 
securities on the Exchange was not active. Table 2 shows the number of listed 
securities by type from 1994 to 1998. 
n Emery, Robert F. The Bond Markets ofDeveloping East Asia. Colorado: Westview Press, 1997 
p.28-32. ‘ 
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TABLE 2 NUMBER OF LISTED SECURITffiS BY TYPE 
Asat30 June 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number oflisted securities 965 1,002 1,087 1,459 1 )73 
Ordinary shares 517 537 562 627 675 
Preferred shares 3 3 3 5 5 
Warrants 296 261 259 488 297 
Unittrusts/mutualfimds 48 52 47 43 30 
Debtsecurities 101 149 216 296 266 
Source: SEHK "Administrative Report 1998: About the Exchange，，found at 
website http://www. sehk. com. hk/ccd/annual 
Even though the number oflisted issues has increased sharply over the years, 
secondary trading of debt instruments on the Exchange is rare. Daily trading 
turnover of listed debt securities for the year ended 30 June 1998 was only around 
HKD0.65 million, as opposed to the HKD12.9 billion for equity stock. In view of 
the inactive secondary market, the HKMA is planning to extend the existing trading 
platform of automatic order matching system (AMS) to debt instruments. A pilot 
test on listing and trading ofEFN will be launched in the third quarter of 1999. This 
will be further discussed under section of “Listing of EFN and other quasi-
govemment issues” in Chapter VI. 
Over-the-counter (OTQ Market 
Attributed to the advantages of no levy as well as the possible evasion of tax 
records, trading of bonds mainly takes place on the OTC market. However, unlike 
the former two markets where there are proper records of trading, there is no reliable 
data measuring the activity of OTC market. The liquidity of bonds in the OTC 
market is largely a function of supply from the syndication group. Traders are able 
2 0 
to consult their Reuter and Telefax screens to get bid quotations. However, because 
ofthe legal restriction to sell bonds short and the difficulties to obtain the physical 
instrument for delivety, dealers are reluctant to provide ask prices. Consequently, 
the OTC market in bonds is rather thin.^^ 
Clearing and Settlement 
Clearing and settlement of debt instruments in Hong Kong are arranged 
through three systems, HKMA's computerised book-entry system for both EFBN 
and private eligible debts，the clearing and settlement arrangements for local HKD 
bond transactions in the OTC market and the highly computerised system of the 
SEHK.i9 
HKMA's computerised book entry svstem 
A book-entry clearing and settlement system was set up in March 1990 to 
match with the first issuance of Exchange Fund Bills. Central Moneymarkets Unit 
(CMU) service is operated by the HKMA and offers an efficient，safe and 
convenient clearing and custodian system for HKD debt instruments. Operated as a 
scripless book entry system, CMU handles debt instruments which are immobilised 
or dematerialised. Transfer of title is effected in computer book entry form. CMU 
^^  Emery, Robert F. The Bond Markets ofDeveloping East Asia. Colorado: Westview Press 1997 
p.31. ， 
19 n>id, p.32-36 
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is capable ofhandling registration, clearing and movement ofsecurities. Payment is 
made by directly debiting the clearing account of recognised dealer or the dealer's 
correspondent bank. Since December 1993，the HKMA has extended CMU service 
to other high quality HKD debt securities. Furthermore, in December 1994, CMU 
was linked to Euroclear and Cedel which are the largest international clearing 
systems in the world. This linkup has widened the investor base and took HKD debt 
securities to a platform accessible to overseas investors. In January 1996, CMU 
service was further extended to debt denominated in foreign currency. 
With the successful launching of RTGS system in December 1996，the 
HKMA has achieved real time Delivery versus Payment (DvP) capabilities for all 
debt securities transactions cleared and settled with CMU. This greatly enhances the 
efficiency and minimises the risks associated with the settlement of payments. 
hi December 1997, CMU has linked up with the Central Securities 
Depositories (CSD) in Australia. The HKMA has also joined the Reserve Bank 
Information and Transfer System (RITS) and the Austraclear which are the 
settlement systems for the Australian government and private sector securities 
respectively. With this linkage, the HKMA is now able to offer to all CMU 
members an access to hold and trade securities in RITS and Austraclear. hi 
addition, in April 1998, the HKMA and the Reserve Bank New Zealand have set up 
a bilateral securities linkage on reciprocal basis between CMU and Austraclear New 
Zealand. This enables investors in Hong Kong and New Zealand to hold and settle 
debt securities cleared in each of these two systems. 
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As at 31 December 1997, there were 554 private debt issues with a total 
nominal value ofHKD199 billion lodged with CMU, an increase of 48% compared 
withthevalue in 1996.^° 
Clearing and settlement in the OTC 
Besides CMU service, there is no centralised system for the clearing and 
settlement of transactions in private sector bonds. The clearing and settlement is 
carried out through a physical exchange of certificates, checks and signed transfers. 
CCASS ontheSEHK 
Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Limited (HKSC) is the official 
clearing house for stocks on the SEHK. It owns and operates the central clearing 
and settlement system (CCASS) as well as related depository, custodial, nominee 
and share registration services for eligible securities listed on the SEHK. Instead of 
cleared and settled through the CCASS，listed debt instruments are handled by banks 
or securities companies through their banks. However, to further enhance the 
liquidity in secondary market, the HKMA is planning to list its EFN on the 
Exchange and make use of CCASS in clearance and settlement. In January 1999, 
the SEHK issued a consultation paper on the proposed market infrastructure. Jn 
,n •»«• 
Source: HKMA statistics found at website http://www.info.gov.hk/hkmay'stat 
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future, the same arrangement may be adopted to other debt instruments. The 
prospective development in this aspect will be discussed in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTERW 
RECENT mNOVATIONS AND HKMA'S EFFORTS 
Established in 1993, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) is widely 
recognised as the quasi-central bank of Hong Kong. A central bank's major 
functions such as the issuance of currency and the determination of interest rate are 
still decentralised to the three note-issuing banks and the Hong Kong Association of 
Banks respectively. However, the HKMA has taken up the more active role of a 
central bank in banking supervision as well as the formation and implementation of 
monetary policy. Its engagements in market operations and reserves management 
have become more active. This is well illustrated in the setting up of discount 
window and the recent measures taken in the active defence of local currency. By 
the same token, the HKMA is also keen on developing the local debt market of 
Hong Kong to mobilise resources for long-term economic development. 
In fact, as early as 1990 the Government has started planning the 
development of a local debt market. The successful launching of Exchange Fund 
Bills and Notes programme provides a stable supply of high quality paper that paves 
the way to build up a domestic market and a benchmark yield curve. Infrastructure 
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such as CMU and RTGS are promoted by the HKMA to substantiate trading and 
settlement. The linkages with the clearing systems in Europe, Australia and New 
Zealand have broadened the investor base of local debt instruments and set the 
foundation for further linkup within the Asia region. Four international credit 
ratings agencies have also set up their offices in the territory to publish ratings to 
prospective issuers. 
Establishment of the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
Background 
In March 1997, the HKMC was incorporated to take up a new strategic role 
in financial intermediation — to channel long-term funding sources for the long-term 
borrowing needs in home financing. It is set to bridge the gap between future 
residential mortgage demand and supply as well as to ease the assetAiability 
mismatches of banks which fund long term mortgages with short-term deposits. Lti 
the long run, the HKMC will be an integral part of the local debt market. 
Since the 1970s, Hong Kong has enjoyed prosperous economic boom and the 
property market has grown vigorously with rising household incomes. The kst two 
decades saw an impressive increase in home ownership ratio, from 27% in 1980 to 
around 45% in 1996.^ ^ Coupled with the surging property prices，the outstanding 
21 Anonymous. “A Hong Kong Mortgage Entity Could Reduce Risk." Asian Wall Street Joumal 
OSfew York) 13 November 1996. 
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amount of mortgage loans increased by almost 30 times, from HKD11.7 billion in 
1980 to HKD348 billion in 1995.22 The demand for home finance, or more 
precisely long-term home fmance is tremendous. 
However, the surging demand is not well matched by the local ftmding 
sources, which mainly take the form of interbank borrowings and customers' 
deposits. With high inflation rates and booming equity markets, over 80% of these 
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two ftmding sources have a maturity of less than or equal to one month. This 
engineers a significant mismatch with the significantly longer-term mortgage loans 
granted to home buyers. 
Mortgage Portfolio 
/JA 
Property lending now accounts for over 40% of total loans for use in Hong 
Kong. However, as the banks' exposure to property lending increases’ the problem 
of maturity mismatch between funding and lending sides worsens, lta order to 
mitigate the concentration and liquidity risks associated with rising loan exposure, 
the HKMC is set up to play the role of a credit-worthy intermediator to tap long-
term savings. Capitalised at HKD2 billion^^ and backed by the government, the 
22 Yam, Joseph. "Speech to the Hong Kong Economic Association" 12 November 1996. 
23 n>id. 
^^  Anonymous. "Guideline lifting likely to be ignored - as before.' South China Moming Post 30 
July 1998. The latest figures show that in March property loans of all forms, including loans to 
developers and mortgage loans, stood at 48.9 per cent ofHK dollar lending by authorised institutions. 
“The initial capitalisation ofthe HKMC is HKD1 billion, bi Sept 1998, its authorised and paid-up 
capital were raised to HKD3 billion and HKD2 billion respectively. With a minimum capital to asset 
ratio of 5%, the HKMC can purchase up to HKD40 billion worth of mortgage. 
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HKMC is capable of issuing long-tem fixed rate debt in the market. The fimding 
can be used to acquire either fixed or floating rate^^ mortgage loans from bank 
lenders, thereby easing the liquidity mismatch and promoting the development of 
fixed rate mortgage markets in the territory. 
A pilot scheme on fixed rate mortgage was launched in March 1998 to test 
the market response to the new mortgage product. Result has been very 
encouraging. The HK$500 million quota allocated for the pilot scheme is almost 
fully committed only half way through the six-month trial period. Up to June 1998, 
the two participating banks have approved 320 loans involving HK$484 million. In 
view ofthe favourable response, the HKMC has raised the pre-commitment amount 
and more banks are invited to launch the fixed rate mortgage products. As at 10 
September 1998, 980 loans involving HKD1.35 billion was approved.�^ Of these, 
523 loans involving HKD734 million have been drawn down.^ ^ In addition, the pre-
committed amount for the purchase of fixed rate mortgages was ftoher raised to 
HKD3.5 billion, ln view of the favourable market response, fixed rate mortgage has 
become a regular programme of the HKMC. 
Mortgage-backed securities 
Set to be one of the most active issuers of debt securities in the territory, the 
HKMC will initially issue unsecured debt paper to fund the purchase of home 
mortgages. This will be followed by the introduction of mortgage-backed securities 
26 An interest swap will be required to hedge against the risk associated with a floating rate mortgage. 
27 HKMC "Announcement ofhalf-year results." Sept 14, 1998. 
28 ftid. 
28 
(MBS). The first batch ofMBS is scheduled to be launched in the fourth quarter of 
1999.29 Unlike some previous MBS packaged by private issuers, the HKMC will 
engineer a standard structure and loan pool for its MBS. The standardisation will 
facilitate the pricing and trading in both primary and secondary markets. 
Before launching of the MBS programme, the HKMC is actively acquiring 
residential mortgages from 23 approved local banks. Under a master mortgage sale 
and purchase agreement, the HKMC will buy only seasoned loans with a loan to 
value ratio at 70% or under, and a debt servicing load below 50% of borrowers' 
income. The first block of mortgage was purchased in November 1997. As at Dec 
31，1998，the HKMC had an outstanding mortgage portfolio ofHKD11.4 billion. 
90% ofwhich were floating rate mortgage while the remaining 10% were fixed rate 
ones.3o The efficiency of the purchasing procedures for floating rate mortgages will 
be further enhanced by the forward commitment facility. Under this facility, the 
HKMC will commit to purchase an agreed amount of mortgages from the approved 
sellers within a period of up to 12 months. This facility should provide banks with 
greater certainty on the amount of loans they can sell to the HKMC within the 
specified period and help them plan their new loan businesses more effectively. 
Issuance programmes ofHKMC 
With a capitalisation of HKD2 billion and a revolving credit facility with 
Exchange Fund for HKD10 billion，the HKMC will raise most of its funding from 
29 Anonymous. "Launching ofMBS in 1999” AppleDaily. Business News. 26 April 1999. 
30 Source: HKMA statistics found at website http://www.info.gov.hkM:ma/hkmc 
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the local debt market. In January 1998，a Note Issuance Programme (Nff) for 
HKD20 billion was first introduced. The Note is cleared through the CMU of the 
, HKMA which also acts as the arranger, custodian, agent and operator. While this 
programme takes financial institutions as its main client base，a second programme 
was signed in June 1998 to target at institutional investors. Under this HKD20 
billion Debt Issuance Programme (Dff), five primary dealers who have good access 
to institutional investors are appointed to play the role of underwriter and market 
maker for securities issued, hi addition, twelve selling group members are 
appointed to help with the distribution of the debt securities. 
Li 1998, the two programmes together raised HKD5.2 billion of funding for 
the HKMC and provide a comprehensive coverage of the investor base ofthe Hong 
Kong dollar debt market. While the HKMC is already providing a consistent supply 
of high quality unsecured debt securities to the market，its programme on MBS will 
also be launched in the last quarter of 1999. la the USA, MBS and unsecured paper 
issued by mortgage corporations constitutes around 24% of all outstanding debt 
securities in 1 9 9 4 , � L i the long run, this stable supply of high quality debt papers 
should enhance market liquidity and promote the development oflocal debt market. 
( 
The role ofMandatory Provident Fund 
Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes (General) Regulation, which 
supplements the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance, was gazetted in 
31 Yam, Joseph. "Speech to the Hong Kong Economic Association." 12 November 1996. 
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April 1998. The MPF system will introduce community-wide retirement provisions 
in Hong Kong. Despite the troubled economic times，the MPF scheme will be M\y 
implemented on 1 December 2000. It will largely be run by the private sector 
subject to the supervision ofthe MPF Schemes Authority. All MPF schemes will be 
defined contribution schemes. All employees and self-employed persons are 
required to contribute a sum equal to 5% of their monthly income while their 
employers have to match the amounts. All contributions must be fully and 
immediately vested and the accrued benefits of employees can be transferred to 
another scheme in case of job changes. All benefits derived from the contributions 
must be preserved until the employees attain the age of 65, or 60 if employment 
ceased.32 
As the domestic population begins to age and the size of retirement savings 
continues to grow, the implementation of the MPF scheme serves as a reservoir for 
the growing retirement savings. In Hong Kong, there are a large number of small 
savers who have little choice but the low risk low return bank deposits and the high 
risk high return equity investment. Traditionally they have little exposure to debt 
securities. Following the launch of MPF scheme, this reservoir of funds can be 
pooled together to invest in a more diversified portfolio with a better retum but a 
moderate risk. This trend towards the institutionalisation of savings will gradually 
prevail. 
On the other hand, the implementation of MPF will facilitate the 
development of Hong Kong debt market by generating a robust demand for fixed 
32 Further information and details of the MPF scheme can be obtained from the Website ofHKSAR 
government: http://www.info.gov.hk 
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income securities. The asset size ofMPF is estimated to hit USD1.5 billion in its 
first year of operation, and is expected to grow to USD9 billion by the end of 2005 
and then ftoher to USD22 billion by the end of2010.^^ Though the funds are given 
discretion on the portfolio-mix as well as the currency-mix, they are subject to the 
spirit of providing steady benefits at retirement. Therefore, hedging is required to 
> 
bring any foreign currency exposure to within 70% of assets,4 Besides, it is 
expected that a considerable portion of the funds will be invested in high-quality 
fixed income instruments which provide both a prudent investment choice and a 
better return than depositing. The demand for HKD-denominated debt instruments 
of larger issue sizes, better quality and longer-term maturity will substantially 
increase. The boosting on demand side will ftoher pull for more quality issues, thus 
helping build up the critical mass to kick-start the development of a mature, deep 
and liquid local debt market. 
33 Yam, Joseph. "Speech in Asian Debt Conference." July 1998. 
34 Yiu, Enoch & Hughes, Duncan. "International Monetary Fund conference puts Hong Kong 
financial services sector into global focus." South China Moming Post 8 March 1997. 
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CHAPTERV 
REGIONAL FORCES AND THREATS 
Syndication loan and credit crunch in the region 
To finance the fast growing economies in Asia, governments and 
corporations have tapped various kinds of funding sources in the loan and capital 
markets. While we see some sovereign issuers start to access the capital market, 
syndication financing remains to be the dominant channel of capital raising in Asia. 
Syndicated loan is a co-ordinated funding arrangement between banks and borrower. 
Through the appointment of an arranger bank, basic terms and conditions of the / 
prospective loan will be set out to participants of the syndicate. Participating banks, 
instead of lending individually to the borrower, pool their resources together and 
lend as a group. They all bear the same terms and conditions of the loan while the 
arranger takes charge of loan documentation, agency work，publicity and signing. 
Attributed to its simplicity in origination, flexibility of borrowing terms, looser 
lending criteria out of risk pooling among the syndicate, syndication loan is the 
preferred financing tool and accounted for 73% of all capital raised in Asia in 
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1996.35 According to AsiaMoney, total signed loans for Asian borrowers had risen 
steadily from USD33.1 billion in the first half of 1995 to USD42.5 billion and 
USD52.1 billion in the same period of 1996 and 1997 respectively.^^ Alone in Hong 
Kong, the leading syndication centre in Asia, the volume ofloans arranged for local 
borrowers rose to a peak of USD42 billion in 1997.^ ^ 
However, as Asia steps into the worst era since the oil crisis, business 
environment has changed at an unyielding pace. What we have seen throughout the 
region is a fast evaporation of wealth, sharp decline in asset prices，threat to 
financial stability, and most of all, a manifestation of sudden capital flight and 
investment retreat. The syndication loan market in Hong Kong has been 
particularly devastated. As banks suffered huge bad debts and curtailed their 
participation, as well as the withdrawals of the in-trouble Japanese banks, volume of 
syndicated loans arranged for Hong Kong borrowers dropped drastically by 82% 
from the peak of USD42 billion inl997 to just USD7 billion in 1998.38 It should be 
emphasised that the withdrawal of Japanese banks was critical as they have 
accounted for as much as one-third^^ of the liquidity in the past. 
Besides bringing a contraction in demand from borrowers as well as 
withering domestic consumption, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) does induce a 
worldwide tendency to deleverage and alleviate the over-exuberance of Asian 
borrowers in prior years. Syndication financing，usually originated in bulk sum 
35 Societe GeneraIe Asia. "Syndicated loans." AsiaMoney September 1997, p2-5. 
36 Parsons, Nick. "Credit still flows in Hong Kong." AsiaMoney September 1997. 
37 Anonymous. "Syndication loan volume shrinks 82% as exuberance disappears." South China 
Moming Post 28 January 1999. 
38 ftid. 
39 Source: Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly report 
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shared by a pool or syndicate, generally offers more flexibility and much cheaper 
pricing than fixed-rate issues. Naturally it has become the preferred source of flmd 
raising. However, this funding source is short-run in nature and needs a dynamic 
market for refinancing to meet the usually long payback period of infrastructure 
projects where the funds are invested. 
As a result ofthis market-generated capital flight and credit crunch, smaller 
companies in Hong Kong could not just get into the syndication market for ftmding. 
Even the blue chips and the most well-known companies are required to bear an 
Asian premium for loans during this crunch period. Nevertheless, the shrinking of 
the local syndication market and the painful experience of many corporations 
provides warnings to entrepreneurs and finance practitioners in the city. Now, while 
borrowers are tapping funds through other channels in the market, local fixed 
income investors are filling the gap left by syndicated groups of banks. The 
HKD1.5 billion three-year fixed-rate offering by Hutchison in January 1999 is a 
good example of this. According to Solomon Smith Bamey, more than HKD13 
billion was tapped in the debt market by leading developers in January 1999，which 
is almost the same amount raised in the previous seven months. 
As illustrated, the Asian economies are facing collapse in market confidence, 
flee of international capital and credit crunch in financial markets. To solve these 
market-created problems, we should employ market-based solutions, which the 
HKMA is pursuing as will be discussed in a later section. 
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The inadequacy ofJMF rescue package 
The Asian Financial Crisis has started by drying up the liquidity of a few 
small Asian economies, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. The 
contagion spread capital flight from South Korea, China, Hong Kong, over Siberia 
to Russia and across the Pacific to Latin America. The accumulated capital inflows 
into these economies over recent years has suddenly turned into a sharp capital 
outflow. Accompanied by a massive contraction in international credit, Asian 
economies fmd their foreign exchange reserves depleting as rapidly as the fall in 
their currencies. In fact, some Asian countries with moderate foreign reserves do 
actually owe more short-term debt. Table 5.1 shows the short-term debt and foreign 
reserves of a few distressed Asian countries just prior to the outbreak of the AFC in 
July 1997. 
TABLE 3 SHORT-TERM DEBT AND RESERVE OF DISTRESSED 
ASIAN COUNTRffiS AS AT 30 JUNE 1997^^ 
Countries Short-term debt Reserves % of debt to reserve 
Philippines ~~~ ~~~8 10 80 
Indonesia 35 20 175 
Malaysia 16 27 59 
Thailand 46 31 148 
South Korea 70 34 206 
Taiwan 22 90 24 
(All figures in USD billion) 
Source: Bank for Litemational Settlement，DvC^ 
^ Delhaise, Philippe F. "The cure for the Asian Flu." Financial Planning 1 December 1998. 
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If a country with more short-term debt than reserves is declined to renew the 
debt, she would go into default as the reserves would never meet the immediate 
obligations. This phenomenon was exactly what was happening in Thailand, 
todonesia and South Korea. As the crisis emerged, nearly all short-term creditors 
and international funds pulled out from the market and demanded their fimds at the 
same time. The Memational Monetary Fund (DvIF), whose purposes are 
maintaining international economic stability and helping countries overcome an 
immediate lack of foreign reserve, is the ideal authority to remedy the situation. 
The three mostly hit countries in the crisis, Thailand, Monesia and South 
Korea quickly reached agreements with JMF on the conditions of rescue packages. 
Among other conditions, the major principles under the packages include reductions 
in economic growth, curbing of inflation, recapitalisation of banks, shooting-up of 
short-term interest rate，austerity of budget programmes and the liberalisation of 
markets, which are analysed as follows: 
Reduction in economy growth 
As the Asian countries had enjoyed strong and consistent economic growths 
over the decade, many Asian governments and corporations presumed strong and 
persistent growth a norm in their economic development. As they were 
overwhelmed by the strong growth figures and the grand infrastructure projects, 
their economic policies and investment decisions were often short-sighted. Vivid 
growth and expansion were achieved at the expense of a prudent and regulated 
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financial system. DvEF's prescription is to ensure a full reform and a healthy 
development offinancial and monetary system before the economies take offagain. 
Curbing of inflation 
The positive side of currency devaluation is the increase in competitiveness 
and hence a growth in future exporting. Balance of payments will gradually 
improve to pay off debts and accumulate reserves. However, inflation will gradually 
eat off the gain in competitiveness. The M F ' s prescription is to stabilise the 
currency so as to retain the benefits of devaluation. 
While the two principles above are reasonable, the writer is sceptical to the 
following five: 
Recapitalisation ofbanks 
Aiming at a quick reform of the banking system, DVff requires the banks of 
distressed countries to raise their capital adequacy ratio to the international standard 
of 8%. However，even banks would find it difficult to raise fresh equities under 
extreme market conditions. Their only way to improve the capital adequacy ratio is 
to further reduce lending. The consequence is a severe credit crunch. 
38 
As their currencies had devalued drastically, the export-driven Asian 
countries would naturally benefit from the increase in competitiveness. However, as 
they also rely on imported raw materials and semi-finished products, the sharp 
contraction in bank credit would deprive a viable business even the chance brought 
by devaluation. 
Shooting-up of short-term interest rate 
The MF ' s philosophy is that a high interest rate can retain the liquidity of 
foreign investors, thus avoiding a sweeping flight of capital. Therefore, short-term 
interest rate should be kept at a high level to provide the incentive. However, capital 
flight is more of a problem of confidence on the future balance of payment of a 
nation, rather than merely the attractiveness of return. The recent fall in Brazil Real 
and the skyrocketing interest rate in Brazil is a good illustration. The market focus at 
crisis time is the confidence. 
In addition, as Asian companies traditionally rely more on short-term 
funding. Like the previous factor on capital adequacy ratio, surging short-term 
interest rate will deprive viable business from the chance of recovery, put heavy 
burden of compounding interest on delinquent borrowers and most of all, discourage 
even sound investment. 
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Austerity of budget programmes 
Fiscal austerity is proposed by the JMF to control government spending and 
thereby reduce budget deficits. However, this will cause deflation and global 
demand to shrink. Deflationaty cycles are dragging forces against a recovery, whieh 
cannot be underestimated. Tightening fiscal policy exacerbates the economic 
downturn and it will be even tougher for banks and heavily-indebted industries to 
turnaround. In addition, under extreme conditions, investment sentiment is 
irrational and market simply fails to function normally. It is doubtfuI whether the 
allocation of capital resources will be efficient. Government's planning and 
expenditure on a few strategic industries are important for the long-run productivity 
of the economy. 
Liberalisation of market 
This last principle on the openness of the financial market to foreign 
investors is controversial. There seems to be a view that only foreign banks are 
capable of investing huge sum to buy out these in-trouble institutions and 
introducing the standards of professional financial intermediation. Such reforms are 
essential to the recovery of banking system in the distressed economies. However, 
under such desperate market sentiment, it remains a question whether the property 
and equity markets in turmoil will fairly reflect asset values. 
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Despite queries on the credit worthiness of these conditions, they are all in 
process in exchange for the precious M F ' s rescue packages - USD17 billion bailout 
ofThailand, USD43 billion bailout ofMonesia and USD57 billion bailout of South 
Korea.4i While the sacrifice of these Asian countries in distress are difficult to 
estimate, the liberalisation of financial market and adoption of Westem 
professionalism in market intermediation are irreversible. This equipment of more 
professional capital markets will streamline the access of borrowers to adequately 
tailored funding. This will be an important evolution towards the emergence of a 
regional debt centre. 
Guarantee to distressed nations 
Threatened by capital flight in a world-class liquidity crisis, the market needs 
a powerful lender of last resort, capable of reversing or at least alleviating the 
massive contraction of international credit. A good approach is to provide guarantee 
to these distressed countries so that market panic can be curbed and resources can be 
mobilised to remedy the sufferings after crisis. 
In November 1998, the Japanese government has offered to work with 
multilateral agencies to provide guarantees for bonds issued by troubled Asian 
countries42. The plan, funded by a USD30 billion aid package from Japan, is 
originated from an innovative guarantee programme from the World Bank. In 
41 Anonymous. "What did it get us?" Wall Street Journal 20 January, 1999. 
42 Raband, Belinda. "Japanese Guarantee Offer May Lift Asian Bond Issues" Asian Wall Street 
Journal flSfew York) 9 November 1998. 
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October 1998, the World Bank provided a guarantee to the USD300 million issue of 
the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand. This raised the barely investment-
grade triple-B-minus instrument to a more respectable single-A-minus and the issue 
was successful. 
Also in November 1998, Japan Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and USA 
President Bill Clinton announced in their joint statement that Japan, the USA, the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank will set up a special fund of USD5 
billion to guarantee sovereign bonds to be issued by Asian countries43. 
Though the total sum ofUSD35 billion from the two guarantee programmes 
is small, the development does shed some lights on the revival of Asia. First, the 
provision of guarantees serves some multiplier effect to leverage the capital base of 
various multilateral agencies to make more credit available to the economies in 
distress. Second, with the guarantee from these multilateral agencies，the issues will 
enjoy a higher rating that lowers the funding costs. Third, the guarantee will also 
trigger re-participation of long-term institutional investors into the Asian markets as 
the perceived risks of these backed instruments are much lower. Di all, the 
provisions of guarantees enables a more efficient allocation of rescue capital than 
simply direct lending. The chain effect will help revitalise the Asian bond market. 
A market solution 
43 Anonymous. AfxNews (London) 16November 1998. 
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As discussed in previous sections, the Asian Financial Crisis was originated 
from the severe funding mismatch coupled with a market-generated capital flight 
and credit crunch. Without a sizeable bond market, Asian companies had to resort 
to short-term USD loans to finance toll roads, phone systems, power plants and 
many others that have long payback period and revenues in local currencies. That 
mismatch in both maturity and currency crippled the region when liquidity 
evaporated and currencies went into free fall in the AFC. 
The first problem in funding mismatch can be solved internally by radical 
reform of the banking system and the financial market. Raising professionalism in 
bank lending as well as the development of a regional debt market are seen as the 
only rescues. The latter is particularly important in providing a long-term funding 
source to sustain economic growth. 
However, the second problem in capital flight and credit crunch, resulting 
from collapse of confidence, is external in dimension. It cannot be resolved without 
setting the market back into motion. 
While the rescue packages of the M F could help countries overcome an 
immediate lack of foreign reserves, liquidity of the economies had already dried up. 
Collapse in confidence and credit crunch weakened market vigour. As the countries 
in distress desperately sought rescue package’ the JMF jumped in by lending USD17 
billion to Thailand in mid-1997. Then, it was the USD43 billion bailout of 
Indonesia. It was followed by the USD57 billion bailout for South Korea. In July 
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1998，it came the USD22.8 billion bailout for Russia and hopefully, the last 
USD41.5 billion bailout to Brazil in hope of extinguishing the Asian flames. 
But how much can JMF afford before the stability of international financial 
markets be brought to order? Just paying off or filling the gap of fleeing capital is 
not sufficient. As the chaos is generated in the market, focus should be brought 
back to the origin to reverse the capital flight. The renewed participation of long-
term institutional investors such as mutual and pension funds is essential to a 
sustainable recovery. Therefore, the key is to make use of the limited public funds 
and the market to kick-start private money and generate snowballing effect on 
market re-participation. 
Various renowned international financial supranationals such as the MF, the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank can contribute to bring this market 
solution into practice. Similar to the guarantee on distressed nations as outlined in 
previous section, these supranationals can issue high-quality debt paper in Asian 
markets. Provided a well structured set of covenants on borrowers, the funds raised 
can be used to alleviate the liquidity needs as well as to capitalise the financial sector 
of the distressed economies. As the supranationals themselves are triple A in credit 
rating and the instruments are well governed by covenants, the issues will be granted 
triple A rating as well and normal market interest rate can be secured. The issues 
will be appealing to both international and regional surplus economies and 
households. This supranational-issuance programme can exactly reverse the capital 
flight and thus break down the credit crunch at crisis time. 
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Emergence of regional rivalry 
A SD300 million 3-year bond was issued in Singapore by the International 
Finance Corporation in October 1998. This was the first Singapore dollar-
denominated bond issued by a supranational entity and it marked a step forward by 
Singapore in rivalling with Hong Kong as the leading debt market in the region. 
Singapore, a long-time challenger to the role of Hong Kong as an 
international financial centre, took the very chance in September 1998 when the 
HKMA issued letters to request the supranational borrowers to desist from raising 
funds at short maturity. During that golden period when the HKMA was busy 
defending the peg and aroused unprecedented controversy in intervening the equity 
market, the Singapore government wooed these supranational and bilateral agencies 
to issue local-currency bonds. Undoubtedly this welcome mat to supranational 
agencies will benefit Singapore from an increase in high-quality bond issuance. 
Despite the strategy, Hong Kong should remain as the regional debt market 
leader. 
With well-funded government-linked companies controlling about 65 per 
cent of the economy, inactive government bond market and low interest rates, there 
is basically a lack of need to raise funds in Singapore. The government-linked 
companies and statutory bodies tend to have a lot of surplus funds. Meanwhile, 
government-issued debts are mostly held to maturity by banks to meet their liquidity 
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reserve requirements. So a vibrant secondary market in these instruments is unlikely 
to develop. 
The Singapore debt market is made up of 2-10 year government issues, a 
range of small-scale corporate issues and the Asian dollar bond market. At the end 
of 1997, Singapore had around US$14 billion of government bonds and bills 
outstanding. In the private sector, 48 issues of corporate bonds raised SD5.9 billion 
in 1997, while the Asian dollar bond market raised USD1.1 billion through 49 
issues.^ The size of its debt market is only a fraction of that in Hong Kong. Its 
small size is incompatible with the sums required to fund the financial reforms and 
infrastructure projects in the region. 
Another major hindrance to Singapore is the existing restrictions imposed on 
foreign investors regarding the holding of Singapore Dollar. The Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS) has a long-standing policy to discourage the 
intemationalisation of the Singapore Dollar. Through the implementation of the 
Notice to Banks MAS 621, which spells out the specific do's and don'ts which banks 
have to follow, the use of the Singapore Dollar outside Singapore for activities 
unrelated to Singapore's real economy is restricted.^^ The policy has helped mitigate 
the currency from the volatility that the other Asian economies were suffering. 
However, it also poses a limit on the investment of overseas funds in Singapore 
dollar-denominated debt. Though a gradual intemationalisation of the Singapore 
^ Source: information is found at website http://www.mas.sg 
45 Lee, Hsien Loong. "Improving the hardware of the financial sector" Speech given by the 
Chairman ofMAS at the official launch ofthe MAS electronic payment system, 13 August 1998. 
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dollar is underway, the government still has a lot to do to catch up with the financial 





Due to the heavy foreign and domestic indebtedness prior to their takeover in 
1949, the Communist government was very cautious in her approach to debt 
financing. As tax served as the major vehicle for government ftmding, the 
Communist government used bonds only sporadically. In the founding of the 
People's Republic in 1949, there was a small issue of government bond. 
Afterwards, during the first five year plan from 1953-1958, a substantial government 
bond programme was also undertaken to finance economic construction. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese government paid off all the indebtedness in 1968. It was 
not until in 1978 that the economic reform of Deng Xiaoping promoted the 
development of a formal bond market. The strong demand for capital in 
infrastructure projects catalysed the emergence of the first treasury bond in 1981严 
However, they were sold to state employees and Chinese institutions under a 
恥 Chen, Ji & Thomas，Stephen C. "China's untapped resources." China Business Review 25 
(January/February 1998): 30-36. 
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compulsory purchase plan. Bond interest rates also differ according to the 
purchaser's identity. Due to such administrative constraints, the growth of bond 
market in PRC has been limited. In 1995, total PRC government debt outstanding 
was only about 23% of GDP, versus the 63% of USA, 59% of UK and 60% of 
Germany in 1996/^ 
Though the development of China's bond market is shallow, we can foresee 
more active issues of China's international bonds in the coming decade. As the 
country moves to restructure its state-owned enterprises (SOE) and pushes ahead 
with major infrastructure investment, the need for long-term funding is tremendous. 
In 1996 and 1997，the central government allocated USD2.5 billion and USD3.6 
billion to cover enterprises' debts to state banks. The provision will certainly go to a 
peak in 1998 and 1999 following the Asian Financial Crisis. Recently, the Ministry 
of Finance announced that it would issue USD32.5 billion in bonds to recapitalise 
the four largest local state banks,8 In addition, to alleviate the social unrest 
resulting from the layoffs associated with SOE reform, the central government has 
speeded up its housing reform and infrastructure projects. 
Recently, China has increased investment in infrastructure facilities by 
USD12 billion. The increase will inflate the budget deficit in the fiscal year 1998 to 
over RMB 150 billion^�which will be financed by bond issuance. Estimates by the 
World Bank reveal that the T-bond market could grow to USD154 billion by 2005， 
47 Chen, Ji & Thomas’ Stephen C. "China's untapped resources." China Business Review 25 
(JanuaryyTebruary 1998): 30-36. 
^^  Anonymous. "Recapitalisation of state banks." Business China 16 March 1998. 
49 Anonymous. "Ministry issues circular on investment in infrastructure." BBC Monitoring Asia 
Pacific. S April 1999. 
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an enormous increase from the USD40 billion in 1995.^ ® This massive supply of 
quality debt will provide the lifeblood for Hong Kong to develop as the leading bond 
centre in Asia. 
The non-govemment bond sector ofPRC is even smaller. Non-government 
debt instruments include corporate and corporate convertible bonds, state investment 
bonds, state investment company bonds and bank financial bonds. Total outstanding 
ofthese four types ofbonds was USD22.3 billion in 1994.^ ^ 
1999 is a golden year for Hong Kong to play this gigantic role for China. 
Following the listing of the seventh issue of Chinese bonds on the Exchange in 
December 1998, the SEHK signed an agreement with China's Ministry of Finance 
for listing of bonds issued by the People's Republic of China. In fact, constrained 
by administrative measures and an inadequate regulatory framework, China needs an 
offshore finance centre to launch its treasury bonds and activate the secondary 
market. The signing marks the full support of PRC to develop Hong Kong as a 
fully-fledged bond market for China. 
Since 1993，China has already listed seven of its sovereign bonds on SEHK. 
Though trading is still done over the counter, the listing status enables institutions 
limited to listed products to invest in the paper, thus expanding the investor base. In 
addition, to enhance liquidity in secondary market, the SEHK is planning to develop 
a retail market for fixed income instruments on the Exchange. A consultation paper 
'0 Chen, Ji & Thomas’ Stephen C. "China's untapped resources." China Business Review 25 
(JanuaryyTebruary 1998): 30-36. 
1 Chen, Ji & Thomas，Stephen C. "China's untapped resources." China Business Review 25 
(January/February 1998): 30-36. 
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was already published to explore the desired market infrastructure for listing of 
EFN. If the pilot scheme on EFN is successful, it is expected that a similar 
infrastructure can be implemented on other fixed income instruments. This will 
attract more issues from China as well as other sovereign debts that are fundamental 
for a deep Asian bond market to take off. 
Listing ofEFN and other quasi-govemment issues 
With an aim to activate the secondary trading and kick-start the local debt 
market, the SAR government has been planning for the listing and trading of debt 
instruments on the Exchange. In November 1998, the SEHK announced its plans to 
list the debt instruments of the HKMC, MTRC and AA on the Exchange. This was 
confirmed in the Financial Secretary's budget report in March 1999 in relation to the 
listing ofEFN and possibly other debt instruments. 
A first consultation paper on the prospective infrastructure for listing of EFN 
was published in January 1999. In order to make the EFN accessible to retail 
investors, the existing trading platform of automatic order matching and execution 
system will be used. Trades will be settled through CCASS on a T+2 basis. 
Initially, settlement will be on a trade-for-trade basis but it may be changed to 
Continuous Net Settlement in fiiture. A linkage will also be established to allow 
free-of-payment transfers between participants of CMU and CCASS.^ ^ Jn addition, 
52 This linkage is aimed at facilitating delivery ofEFN between theprofessional and the exchange 
EFN markets. Source: SEHK "Consultancy paper on the proposed market infrastructure for trading 
ofEFN.’ January 1999. 
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facilities will be introduced to allow retail investors to tender for EFN when they are 
initially offered for subscription. 
The listing and trading of EFN on the Exchange will greatly enhance the 
liquidity in the secondary market and help boost the development of the local debt 
market. While the proposed market infrastructure will initially only be available to 
the HKD33 billion worth of EFN, they may be modified in future for other debt 
securities of public issuers such as MTRC, HKMC, AA, KCRC as well as some 
corporate issuers. 
Trend of securitisation 
Securitisation is the repackaging of receivables or assets in tradable form. 
Receivables are not confined to mortgage payments. They also include proceeds 
from business loans, credit card remittances, rent payments, student loans, etc. Its 
origin can be traced back to the USA around the 1970s when the Government 
National Mortgage Association first issued mortgage-back-securities. However, the 
banking crisis of the 1980s in the USA catalysed its development. After years of 
easy credit and loose monetary policy, funding and liquidity finally became more 
costly. Banks had no other way but to tum to asset securitisation as an additional 
source of funding to free up capital. 
A similar situation is now evident in Asia. The over-exuberance of Asian 
borrowers and the maturity mismatch make securitisation an attractive channel for 
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banks to escape from the Asian premium and free up more capital. On the 
borrowers' side, the dtying up ofliquidity and downgrading also force them to tum 
to their asset pools and demonstrate the quality of their best assets for funding. For 
the investors, asset-backed securities offer a more secure way ofgaining exposure to 
the region, bi all, the AFC has sharpened the attractiveness of securitisation to Asia. 
Securitisation offers a diversification of funding sources and accessibility to 
capital markets. Usually，with a tailored segregation of assets for securitisation，the 
new issue alone will generate a higher credit rating than the issuer herself In 
addition, ratings can be even higher with the various structures of credit 
enhancement such as over-collateralisation^^ cash reserve ftmds^^, monoline 
guarantees55 and so on. Even the exchange risk can be alleviated using currency 
swaps. All these wrapping and structures make the once unattractive borrowers 
appealing to most international investors. For example, in June 1997, Dah Sing 
Bank securitised its Hong Kong residential mortgage portfolio via the issue through 
a special purpose vehicle ofUSD300 million. The issue was enhanced by a first loss 
provision from Asia Ltd for USD33 million as well as a full guarantee from 
CapMAC56. Coupled with a triple-A currency swap from General Re, the bond was 
53 Over-collateralisation is the provision of more underlying assets so that the value of collateral 
exceeds the sum raised from the issuance. As protection to investors increases, credit risk associated 
with the issue is lower. 
54 A cash reserve fund is a pool of money set aside to satisfy obligations of the instrument in case of 
receivable shortfall. This also reduces the credit risk of the issue. 
55 In contrast to over-collateralisation and cash reserve fund which are forms of intemal credit 
enhancements, monoline guarantee is an external credit enhancement in which the issue and the 
payments are guaranteed by one of five monoline financial guarantors MBIA, Ambac, CapMAC, 
FSA and ASIA Ltd. Except ASDV Ltd. which was rated A by S&P's, all the other four insurers are 
rated triple A. 
56 Asia Ltd. and CapMAC are monoline issuers which are rated A and tripe-A by S&P's and Moody's 
respectively. 
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rated triple-A by Moody's. On the other hand, the standalone rating of Dah Sing 
Bank is not as attractive. Though the bank does not have a Moody's rating. 
Standard & Poor's has assigned public information ratings ofBBB-pi to the Bank.^^ 
This illustrate the significance of credit enhancement on the credit risk associated 
with a securitised issue. 
With a developed legal framework, pools of high quality assets and a liquid 
swap market. Hong Kong is one of the most mature securitisation markets in Asia. 
Furthermore, the establishment ofthe HKMC and its securitisation programme will 
bring standardisation to the market, thereby reducing transaction costs and attracting 
greater number of issues. 
In the long run, China can be the strongest asset backed markets in Asia. The 
country's vast and rapidly growing economy has a huge demand for capital. 
Securitisation offers the opportunity to structure a package of credit enhancements 
which is far more palatable to international investors than naked corporate or bank 
risk.58 A number of state bodies including the People's Bank of China, China 
Securities Regulatory Commission and Bureau of State Owned Assets are engaged 
in a consultation process about how to develop its potential. In December 1988, the 
first securitisation deal in China, involving an issue of up to US$200 million, will be 
securitised by the outstanding receivables of a pool of more than 10,000 Chongqing 
enterprises^^. After two years of preparation, the deal has finally won Beijing's 
initial approval and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) has 
” Anonymous. "Asian capital markets news in brief." Euroweek 31 January 1997. 
58 This is illustrated in the example ofDah Sing Bank earlier in the section. 
59 South China Morning Post December 21，1998. 
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already given verbal consent for international credit rating agencies to prepare 
ratings. The issue will be backed by the United States' financial guarantee insurance 
giant MBLAi Assurance and the launch time is expected in the first half of 1999. 
Nevertheless, due to its complicated structure, the development of 
securitisation is highly dependent on the presence of a developed legal framework as 
well as the market's perspective on this new flmding mechanism. One expects each 
new deal in China to trigger waves of legislative acts and regulatory changes. Hong 
Kong is exactly at this premier position to structure deals and open her financial 
infrastructure to mainland's issuers. Securitisation techniques are already widely 
practised in Hong Kong, with lawyers, accountants, rating agencies, financial 
guarantors and investment bankers developing a relatively deep pool of experience. 
Though the legal framework remains the major hindrance to asset securitisation in 
China, this prospective issue will pave the way for the creation of a completely new 




The economic developments of Asian countries have been enormous over 
the last decade. As credit expanded extensively, investment in infrastructure 
projects and growth of equity markets have experienced unparalleled growth. On a 
relative basis, the development of debt markets lagged far behind. Few raise the 
issue until the outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis which swiftly evaporated the 
vigour of prosperous Asia. 
While the detailed mechanism of the AFC is not repeated here, it should be 
stressed that the crisis did stem, at least partly, from the severe mismatch in funding 
and failure of effective intermediation in the region. Our failure to generate long-
term liquidity to fuel regional economic growth inevitably reversed this growth. 
What we need is a solution that can revive market confidence. If we had developed 
a deep, liquid and mature regional debt market, we would not have suffered so much 
in the turmoil. Perhaps the crisis would never have happened at all. 
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The last two sentences summarise the feeling of a typical market participant. 
With hot money kept pouring in for investment opportunities, borrowers found it too 
easy to get bank credits. Most therefore felt that the development of a debt market 
was not necessary. 
Now, the Asians are crying from the pains of sharp recession and contraction 
in wealth. They are all aware ofthe deficiency, bi this aspect, the crisis does inject 
an unprecedented driving force to propel the development of a mature Asian debt 
centre. 
Hong Kong, with an established legal framework, pools of professional 
practitioners, advanced market infrastructure and full financial liberalisation, should 
play a proactive role in commanding such a development. Her unique geographical 
position ofboth within the orbit of emerging market and at the vicinity to Mainland 
China offers the SAR unparalleled opportunity to develop as both a regional debt 
centre and a premier financing centre for China. 
bi fact, all the more developed Asian countries including China, Hong Kong, 
M a , todonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand have their own debt markets. However, owing to the relative small size of 
a single economy, none of them can have a substantial development. A new 
regional financial architecture is therefore needed. Though the launching of MPF 
scheme, establishment of the HKMC and the trend of securitisation will help boost 
the domestic debt market, a union of various fragmented debt centres in the region is 
a more practical way for a regional debt market to take off. Given the available 
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bilateral linkage technology the HKMA is employing with Australia and New 
Zealand, linkages can be established with other regional centres to expand the 
investor base and market depth. Coupled with the modification of the CCASS 
system to apply on clearing of debt instruments, trading in secondary market and 
liquidity will greatly improve. An active secondary bond market can perform a 
maturity transformation function by channelling short-term funds into long-term 
marketable debt, and thereby attracting more issues. Regional union is perhaps the 
most direct way to develop a truly mature and deep debt centre. 
Exploring the China market is also a critical strategy to develop the debt 
market ofHong Kong. Since 1993, a total ofUSD26.4 billion has been raised in the 
equities market ofHong Kong through initial public offerings and placements of 'H 
Share, and ‘Red Chip，. In 1997 alone，46% ofnew equity issued through the SEHK 
was by such companies. On the other hand, out of the total debt and equity 
financing raised by mainland companies in 1997，over 60% of which came from 
Hong Kong.^ This witnesses the interdependency of the capital market of Hong 
Kong and the financing activities of mainland companies. This symbiotic 
relationship offers Hong Kong an unrivalled position to serve as the premier 
financing centre for China. This prospect in the area ofH-bond is already explored 
in a previous section. 
to all. Hong Kong is heading the right direction to develop as the region's 
leading debt centre. Fundamentals in form oflegal framework, market infrastructure 
and professional expertise are deep-rooted. Coupled with the launching of MPF 
60 Tsui, Alec. "Benefits and pitfalls of financial liberalisation." Speech ofStock Exchange ofHong 
Kong 3 June 1998. 
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scheme and the HKMC, domestic demand and supply of debt instruments will be 
greatly boosted. Jn addition, with the advanced technology on bilateral linkage and 
the unrivalled geographical proximity to the China market, Hong Kong will further 
take the role as the premier financing centre for China. Finally, having leamt an 
expensive lesson from the AFC, there is no doubt that Hong Kong and the regional 
economies will have the determination to nurture a truly mature, deep and liquid 




Banks, Erik. The Emerging Fixed-focome Markets in Asia. Basingstoke: 
MacmilIian Publishers Ltd., 1994. 
Emery，Robert F. The Bond Markets ofDeveloping East Asia. Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1997. 
Ho, Scott, Wong. The Hong Kong Financial System. Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1991. 
Hong Kong University. Hong Kong in the Asia-Pacific Region: Rising to the New 
Challenges. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, 1997. 
International Securities tostitute. The Practitioner's Guide to Bonds for Asian 
Issuers. Hong Kong: International Securities Institute, 1995. 
Stock Exchange Hong Kong. A Guide to the Listing of Selectively Marketed Debt 
Securities. The Hong Kong: Stock Exchange ofHong Kong Ltd., August 1994. 
Tsang, Yuk Fong Elly. MBA Thesis: The employment of debt securities in Hong 
Kong - a study of the market's past developments, recent growths and future 
prospects. Hong Kong: University ofHong Kong, 1986. 
World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publication, June 1995. 
World Bank. The Emerging Asian Bond Market: Hong Kong. Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank Publication, June 1995. 
Periodicals 
Anonymous. "A Hong Kong Mortgage Entity Could Reduce Risk." Asian Wall 
Street Joumal (New York) 13 November 1996. 
Anonymous. “Anger as HK Government closes debt market” Euroweek 18 
September 1998，p. 11. 
Anonymous. “Asian capital markets news in brief." Euroweek 31 January 1997. 
60 
Anonymous. "China lines up $500m bond to firm up credit." Euroweek. 29 
August 1997, pl, 6. 
Anonymous. "Fannie Mae HKD1.5 billion global prompts interest in dollar bloc” 
Euroweek 11 July 1997，p. 10. 
Anonymous. "Fannie Mae HKD1.5 billion global prompts interest in dollar bloc" 
Euroweek London 11 July 1997. 
Anonymous. "Guideline lifting likely to be ignored - as before.' South China 
MomingPost 30 July 1998. 
Anonymous. "HK names add domestic tone to bond market." Euroweek. (London) 
22 January 1999, p.21. 
Anonymous. "HKMC adds new variety to HK bonds" Euroweek -April 1998，p. 
24. 
Anonymous. "Hong Kong budget - 2 (exchange fund notes to be listed on stock 
exchange)." Afx News. (London) 3 March 1999, p.l. 
Anonymous. "Japan hammers out 24-T-Yen package to pep up economy.” Jiji 
Press English News Service. (Tokyo) 16 November 1998, p. 1. 
Anonymous. "Ministry issues circular on investment in infrastructure." BBC 
Monitoring Asia Pacific. 8 April 1999. 
Anonymous. "Passing the first milestones." AsiaMonev. December 1997/January 
1998 p.29. 
Anonymous. "Pension Reform to boost HK Market." Emerging markets debt 6 
October 1997, p. 3. 
Anonymous. "Pension reform to boost HK market." Emerging Markets Debt 
Report. 6 October 1997 p.3. 
Anonymous. "Recapitalisation of state banks." Business China 16 March 1998. 
Anonymous. "Securitization in HK" Asiamoney Dec 1997/Jan 1998, p.29-30. 
Anonymous. "Suddenly the MPF becomes urgent for all employers." South China 
Moming Post. 14 March 1999, p.9. 
Anonymous. "Syndication loan volume shrinks 82% as exuberance disappears." 
South China Moming Post 28 January 1999. 
Anonymous. "What did it get us?" Wall Street Journal 20 Januaiy, 1999. 
Anonymous. "What is seciuitization?" Asiamoney Dec 1997/Jan 1998, p.2-5. 
61 
Bemama. "Savings rate for Pacific Economies to be around 25.1 pct in 2005" 
Bemama. MalavsianNational News Agencv. 11 November 1998, p.l. 
Borsuk, Richard. "Dvff admits some errors in Asian crisis 一 fund says it misjudged 
depth oftrouble, but defends tight-money policy." Asian Wall Street Journal C^ew 
York) 20 January 1999. 
Chan, Peter, '^xperts welcome tax break action." South China Moming Post. 
(Hong Kong) 4 March 1999, p.2. 
Chen，Ji & Thomas, Stephen C. "China's untapped resources." China Business 
Review 25 (JanuaryyTebruary 1998): 30-36. 
Chung, kuojih pao. ‘‘China: ongoing SOE changes reshape economy.” China 
Daily. 29 December 1997，p.4. 
Delhaise, Philippe F. "The cure for the Asian Flu." Financial Planning 1 December 
1998. 
Edwards, Ben. "Survey: Financial centres: How now Hong Kong?" The Economist 
May 1998, p. 27. 
Gaily, C. "Mortgage-backed notes without property Risk." Asiamoney 
July/August 1997，p. 11,14 & 16. — 
HKMC "Announcement ofhalf-year results." Sept 14,1998. 
HSBC Markets. "Domestic Bond Markets." Asiamonev September 1997, p. 42. 
Inoue, Kengo. "Japan finds the right policy mix." Asian Wall Street Journal. (New 
York) 25 March 1999, p.6. 
Lamoreaux, Pamela. “A busy year for Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation." Housing 
Finance International Chicago September 1998. 
Lee，Hsien Loong. “Improving the hardware of the financial sector" Speech given 
by the Chairman ofMAS at the official launch of the MAS electronic payment 
system, 13 August 1998. 
Li, Angela. "Mortgage Corp gets tax break." South China Moming Post. (Hong 
Kong) 6 February 1998, p.3. 
Lucas, Louise. "China and Hong Kong in bond pact" Financial Times. (London) 
19 January 1999 p.38. 
Lucas, Louise. "Cruel irony thwarts Asian ambition." Financial Times. (London) 
Migirdeyan, Aret. "New mandate for the World Bank." Journal of Commerce. 10 
February 1998, p.9A. 
Paisley, Ed. "Limits ofLiquidity." Far East Economic Joumal July 1994，p. 47. 
6 2 
Parsons, Nick. "Credit still flows in Hong Kong." AsiaMonev September 1997. 
Raband, Belinda. "Japanese Guarantee Offer May Lift Asian Bond Issues" Asian . 
Wall Street Joumal QS[ew York) 9 November 1998. 
Ridding, John. "A way out of the crisis." Financial Times. (London) 1 May 1998, 
p.8. “ 
Saunders, David. "SAR welcomes underwriting initiative for debt-issuing nations 
guarantor plan hailed" South China Morning Post. (Hong Kong) 10 November 
1998, p.8. 
SEHK. "Consultancy paper on the proposed market infrastructure for trading of 
Exchange Fund Notes." The Stock Exchange ofHong Kong Ltd. January 1999. 
Shale,Tony. "Inthe imageofFannieMae” Euromoney (London)May 1996，p. 20 
Sito, Peggy. “Big developers target debt markets amid liquidity crunch quality 
issues win favour” South China Moming Post. (Hong Kong) 18 February 1999, 
p.2. 
Societe Generale Asia. "Syndicated loans." AsiaMonev September 1997’ p2-5. 
Steinberger, Michael R "Singapore: Asia's second financial hub: Opportunities in a 
Hong Kong exodus?" Global Finance August 1997，p. 46. 
Timmermans, Jeffrey. "Hong Kong firms fmd success with local buyers." Asian 
Wall Street Joumal C i^ew York) 1 February 1999, p.21. 
Timmermans, Jeffrey. “Singapore lures supranationals to its developing debt 
market” Asian Wall Street Journal” O^^ewYork) 19 October 1998, p.29. 
Tsang, Donald. “Asian Bond Market." Speech on Asian Debt Conference 6 July 
1998. 
Tse, Hon Hong. "The Rapidly Developing Hong Kong Debt Market.，，Academic 
Exchange Association ofMacau publication 1997，p. 251. 
Tsui，Alec. "Benefits and pitfalls of financial liberalisation." Speech of Stock 
Exchange ofHong Kong 3 June 1998. 
Utumpom, Pichayapom. "IMF will clarify its Asia-Crisis Review" Asian Wall 
Street Joumal. O^ewYork) 22 January 1999. 
Wamer, Alison. "Re-emerging from a crisis." The Banker April 1998, p. 40 
Yam, Joseph. "Causes of and solutions to the recent financial turmoil in the Asian 
region." A symposium in Commemoration of 50 years of Central Banking in the 
Philippines. January 1999. 
63 
Yam, Joseph. "Speech to the Hong Kong Economic Association." 12 November 
1996. 
Yam, Joseph. "Speech to the Hong Kong Economic Association." 12 November 
1996. 
Yam, Joseph. "Development of the debt market." Speech given in Asian Debt 
Conference on 14 July 1997. 
Yiu, Enoch & Hughes，Duncan. "Memational Monetary Fund conference puts 
Hong Kong financial services sector into global focus." South China Morning Post 
8 March 1997. 
Yiu, Enoch. "Explosive growth ofUSD93b forecast in asset-backed issues." South 
China Moming Post (Hong Kong) 27 January 1999. 
Yiu, Enoch. "Giant listing not end ofMTRC plan." South China Moming Post. 
(Hong Kong) 10 February 1999，p.3, 

CUHK Libraries 
•03?04504 
